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A THEORY OF DISCIPLINE FOR PROFESSIONAL
MISCONDUCT
Nadia N. Sawicki*
The current system of physician discipline is in disarray. Critics in
recent years have denounced state medical boards for inappropriately
screening applicants for medical licensure, failing to discipline dangerous
physicians, and generally being lax in their oversight duties at the expense
of a vulnerable public. At the same time, however, there are few
meaningful limitations on the scope of medical board authority in matters of
professional discipline, and the disciplinary actions boards do take often
seem to bear only a tangential relationship to the competent practice of
medicine.
This Article maintains that if medical boards want to avoid charges
of ineffectiveness – or worse, irrelevance – in achieving public goals, they
must undertake a systematic review of their priorities with respect to
professional discipline.
Specifically, boards should recognize that
disciplining character-related misconduct or criminal behavior occurring
outside the scope of medical practice may not be consistent with the
foundational principles underlying the legislative delegation of disciplinary
authority – namely, concern for public protection tempered by
constitutional fitness to practice requirements. This Article proposes that
boards concerned about character and professionalism instead consider
whether a physician’s conduct implicates any of the core professional
values of medicine (among them, respect for fiduciary principles), and
explains why a theory of discipline grounded in core values is preferable to
a few proposed alternatives.

*

George Sharswood Fellow in Law and Bioethics at the University of Pennsylvania
Law School. J.D., University of Pennsylvania Law School; M.Be., University of
Pennsylvania School of Medicine; B.A., Brown University. The author extends special
thanks to the organizers and participants of the 2008 Health Law Scholars Workshop
sponsored by the St. Louis University School of Law and the American Society of Law,
Medicine, and Ethics, particularly commentators Sandy Johnson, Diane Hoffman, Rebecca
Dresser, and Ana Iltis.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The current system of medical discipline is in disarray. Since the
1970’s, state medical boards have faced criticism from a variety of sources
for inappropriately screening applicants for medical licensure, failing to
discipline dangerous physicians, and generally being lax in their oversight
duties at the expense of a vulnerable public. At the same time, however,
few constraints exist to limit medical board authority in matters of
professional discipline, and the disciplinary actions boards do take often
seem to bear only a tangential relation to the competent practice of
medicine. As the rate of medical malpractice claims continues to rise,1 and
media reports publicize cases of physician misbehavior going unpunished,2
some scholars have gone so far as to question whether the American system
of professional discipline offers any real-world benefits at all.3
This Article argues that it does. Those who challenge the relevance
of professional discipline in American medicine on the basis of its failures
of implementation miss the point. That the modern system of medical
board discipline has been unsuccessful in achieving public goals is no
reason to abandon the system altogether. Instead, health law scholars ought
to clearly identify the goals of professional discipline, identify how and why
medical boards have failed to achieve these goals, and propose solutions for
1

Claudia H. Williams and Michelle M. Mello, “Medical Malpractice: Impact of the
Crisis and Effect of State Tort Reforms,” Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Policy Brief
No. 10 (May 2006).
2
See, e.g., Cheryl W. Thompson, D.C. Board Rarely Punishes Physicians,
Washington Post (April 11, 2005) at A01; Doug J. Swanson, Drug Past, Discipline, Didn’t
Stop Doctor, Dallas Morning News (July 1, 2001), at 1A.
3
See, e.g., C. H. Baron, Licensure of Health Care Professionals: The Consumer's Case
for Abolition, 9 Am. J. L. & Med. 335, (1983); Walter Gellhorn, The Abuse of
Occupational Licensing, 44 U. Chicago L. Rev. 6 (1976); Anthony Ogus, Rethinking SelfRegulation, 15 Oxford J. Legal Studies, 97 (1995); Shirley V. Svorny, Physician
Licensure: a New Approach to Examining the Role of Professional Interests, 25 Econ.
Inquiry 497 (July 1987). Economists, in particular, have long made similar arguments,
questioning the value of licensure and self-regulation in highly insulated and self-protective
professions, like medicine. These authors and others suggest that medical quality and
patient safety could be better safeguarded through market-based solutions that close the
information gap between physicians and consumers. While some steps have been taken in
this direction (see, for example, the website of the Massachusetts Board of Registration in
Medicine, http://profiles.massmedboard.org, which allows patients to search for physician
profiles, including malpractice payments made in the past ten years), it is highly unlikely
that the current system of medical licensure would be abandoned in the foreseeable future.
Accordingly, this Article does not pursue alternatives to medical licensure and discipline as
a means to protecting patient health, but rather evaluates realistic improvements that might
be made to the existing system.
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remedying these failures.
This Article approaches this challenge by focusing on one context in
which medical board actions seem ill-attuned to the legal principles
underlying professional discipline: discipline for character-related
misconduct occurring outside the clinical sphere. Consider, for example, a
Nevada board’s recent decision to discipline a chiropractor for
unprofessional conduct after he was convicted of involuntary manslaughter
for shoving a man at a car wash. In recent years, physicians have been
disciplined on grounds as varied as tax fraud,4 failure to facilitate review of
child support obligations,5 soliciting sex in a public restroom,6 possession of
marijuana for personal use,7 and reckless driving involving alcohol,8 as well
as other conduct that allegedly brings the medical profession into disrepute.
While exact figures are hard to come by, best estimates suggest that less
than thirty percent of medical disciplinary actions are taken on the basis of
negligent medical practice.9 Moreover, because actions taken on the basis
of character-related misconduct are representative of many of the
overarching problems that plague the medical disciplinary system, crafting
a theory that explains why and when boards can discipline for characterrelated misconduct will help boards better exercise their disciplinary
discretion in all contexts.
Part II of this Article traces the development of the modern
American medical disciplinary system, and looks to the constitutional
underpinnings of medical board authority to identify its underlying goals.
Part III demonstrates that medical boards often fail to achieve these goals
when they pursue disciplinary action against physicians who misbehave
4

See, e.g., In re Kindschi, 52 Wn.2d 8, 12 (Wash. 1958); Windham v. Board of
Medical Quality Assurance, 104 Cal. App. 3d 461 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 1980).
5
See, e.g., Dittman v. California, 191 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. Cal. 1999) (holding that
California’s requirement that professional licensees disclose their social security numbers
so that the state can determine if they failed to pay child support does not violate due
process because being current in child support and tax obligations is an element of moral
character and therefore related to fitness to practice).
6
See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Board of Medical Examiners, 35 Cal. App. 3d 1010, 1012
(Cal. App. 2d Dist. 1973)
7
See, e.g., Weissbuch v. Board of Medical Examiners, 41 Cal. App. 3d 924 (Cal. App.
2d Dist. 1974).
8
See, e.g., Griffiths v. Superior Court, 96 Cal. App. 4th 757 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2002).
9
See Darren Grant & Kelly C. Alfred, Sanctions and Recidivism: An Evaluation of
Physician Discipline by State Medical Boards, 32 Journal of Health Politics Policy and
Law 867 (October 1, 2007), compiling data from the Federation of State Medical Boards
identifying negligence-related disciplinary codes as follows: Negligence (14.5%); Failure
to Conform to Minimal Standards of Medical Practice (12.2%); Gross Negligence (7%).
Grant and Alfred also cite data compiled by Public Citizen Research Group identifying
18.8% of sanctions as relating to “substandard care, incompetence, negligence.”
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outside the clinical sphere, and posits a few possible explanations for why
this is the case. Part IV offers a proposal for tying character-related
discipline to fitness to practice, and explains the implications of this
approach for professional discipline more broadly. Finally, Part V
identifies weaknesses in three traditional arguments in support of boards’
broad exercise of disciplinary discretion.
II. PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE IN AMERICAN LAW
This Section describes the legal underpinnings of the current
American system of medical licensure and discipline, traces its historical
development, and briefly describes how the system currently operates in
practice. Drawing on the constitutional justifications for professional
licensure and discipline, this Section identifies two fundamental principles
of the medical disciplinary system in American law – first, an emphasis on
public protection (rather than punishment or compensation); and second, a
recognition that the scope of professional discipline is not allencompassing.
A. Medical Board Authority: History and Practice
Among the unenumerated powers reserved to each state under the
Tenth Amendment is the power to protect the health, safety, and welfare of
its citizenry, commonly known as the police power.10 As explained by the
Supreme Court in Dent v. West Virginia, it is the “power of the state to
provide for the general welfare of its people [that] authorizes it to prescribe
all such regulations as, in its judgment, will secure or tend to secure them
against the consequences of ignorance and incapacity, as well as of
deception and fraud.”11 It is pursuant to their police powers that states are
authorized to regulate law, medicine, and other professions, which they
typically do by delegating authority to professional licensing boards.
As a constitutional grant of authority, this story is a relatively simple
one. But for those familiar with the history of medical licensure, it is much
more complex. The first state medical boards were created in the late 1800s
when private medical associations pushed state legislators to adopt laws
regulating the practice of medicine.12 These efforts were driven by
10

U.S. Const. Amend. X; Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 62 (1872) (describing
the police power as extending “to the protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and
quiet of all persons, and the protection of all property within the State”).
11
Dent v. W.Va., 129 U.S. 114, 122 (1889).
12
Paul Starr, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE, 102-06 (1984);
Ronald L. Akers, The Professional Association and the Legal Regulation of Practice, 2
Law & Soc'y Rev. 463, at 465-67 (1967).
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physicians who, fearful of incursions on their territory by “irregulars” and
“quacks,” were convinced that well-drafted legislation – far from being selfdefeating – could serve an important role in protecting their professional
Though some historians suggest that professional selfinterests.13
protection, rather than concern for patient safety, was the driving force
behind these lobbying efforts,14 the medical practice acts that resulted were,
as a matter of law, clearly adopted pursuant to the legislative authority to
protect public health and safety.
At a minimum, the modern medical practice act defines the practice
of medicine, establishes the requirements for medical licensure, and sets
forth procedures for disciplinary action against licensees.15 The medical
practice act also establishes the composition of the state board of medicine,
the administrative agency responsible for implementing and enforcing the
act’s provisions through its rulemaking and adjudicative powers.16 Modern
medical boards generally include some public members, but are dominated
by physicians appointed by the governor.17
Modern American licensure laws are exclusive; that is, they grant
qualified individuals the right to engage in the lawful practice of medicine,
and prohibit the practice of medicine by unlicensed persons.18 The
13

Akers, at 465-67.
See, e.g., Stanley J. Gross, The Myth of Professional Licensing, 33 American
Psychologist 1109 (1978).
15
See, e.g., N.Y. C.L.S. Educ. § 6521 (Definition of the Practice of Medicine), § 6524
(Requirements for a Professional License), § 6530 (Definitions of Professional
Misconduct). See generally, Federation of State Medical Boards, ESSENTIALS OF A
MODERN MEDICAL PRACTICE ACT (2006).
16
See, e.g., N.Y. C.L.S. Educ. § 6523 (State Board for Medicine). See also Douglas v.
Noble, 261 U.S. 165, 170 (1923) (holding that the delegation of professional regulatory
powers to an administrative board is consistent with the U.S. Constitution). See generally,
Federation of State Medical Boards, ESSENTIALS OF A MODERN MEDICAL PRACTICE ACT
(2006); Federation of State Medical Boards, ELEMENTS OF A MODERN STATE MEDICAL
BOARD (2006).
17
See Carl F. Ameringer, STATE MEDICAL BOARDS AND THE POLITICS OF PUBLIC
PROTECTION, 48-51 (1999); M. Christine Cagle, J. Michael Martinez & William D.
Richardson, Privatizing Professional Licensing Boards: Self-Governance or Self-Interest?,
30 Administration Society 734, 750-51 (1999); Eleanor Kinney, Administrative Law Issues
in Professional Regulation, in Timothy S. Jost ed., REGULATION OF THE HEALTHCARE
PROFESSIONS, 106 (1997).
18
See, e.g., N.Y. C.L.S. Educ. § 6512 (Unauthorized Practice a Crime), § 6513
(Unauthorized Use of Professional Title a Crime). Contrast exclusive licensing laws with
certification laws, which grant qualified individuals the right to use the title of physician in
connection with their practice of medicine, and are exclusive only with respect to the use of
that title, not with respect to medical practice generally. Also contrast this with registration
laws, which require that medical practitioners register their names with a state agency, but
impose no qualification requirements or restrictions on practice. See generally, Robert L.
Hollings & Christal Pike-Nase, PROFESSIONAL AND OCCUPATIONAL LICENSURE IN THE
14
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requirements for obtaining a medical license are relatively consistent from
state to state – generally, the applicant must be a graduate of an approved
medical school, have completed at least one year of an approved graduate
medical education program (residency or fellowship), and have passed the
United States Medical Licensing Examination (USMLE).19 Beyond
imposing educational and training requirements, many medical practice acts
also require that applicants for medical licensure demonstrate good moral
character.20 Some states also impose additional requirements, such as proof
of malpractice insurance coverage;21 a clear criminal background check;22
or age,23 citizenship,24 or residency requirements.
Medical boards’ ongoing duties include periodic re-registration of
licensees, which is typically contingent on their completion of specified
hours of CME.25 However, medical boards rarely impose additional
requirements intended to ensure the quality of care, such as mandatory
recertification or random practice audits, upon physicians who have already
received their licenses.26 Arguably, then, the most important of state
medical boards’ oversight responsibilities with respect to medical quality is
the discipline of professional licensees.
The medical disciplinary process is generally reactive, rather than
proactive. It begins when a member of the public files a complaint, or, in
the case of discipline on the grounds of criminal or civil liability, when a
UNITED STATES: AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY AND PROFESSIONAL RESOURCE, xvii-xix
(1997). For scholarly criticisms of exclusive licensure, see supra note 3. See also Harris S.
Cohen, On Professional Power and Conflict of Interest: State Licensing Boards on Trial, 5
J. of Health Politics, Policy and Law 291 (1980); Walter Gellhorn, The Abuse of
Occupational Licensing, 44 U. Chicago L. Rev. 6 (Autumn 1976); Stanley J. Gross, The
Myth of Professional Licensing, 33 Am. Psych. 1109 (1978); Eliot Freidson, PROFESSION
OF MEDICINE, 23-24 (1988).
19
See, e.g., N.Y. C.L.S. Educ. § 6524 (Requirements for a Professional License). See
generally, American Medical Association, State Medical Licensure Requirements and
Statistics 2007 (2007) [hereinafter, “AMA Licensure Requirements”].
20
See, e.g., N.Y. C.L.S. Educ. § 6524(7). See generally, Hawker v. N.Y., 170 U.S.
189 (1898).
21
See Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 97 Id. 859 (1976).
22
See, e.g., S.C. Code Ann. § 40-47-36 (2007)
23
See, e.g., N.Y. C.L.S. Educ. § 6524(5).
24
See, e.g., N.Y. C.L.S. Educ. § 6524(6); but see In Re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973)
(finding unconstitutional a Connecticut bar rule requiring bar applicants to be United States
citizens).
25
See AMA Licensure Requirements, at 48.
26
Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General, FEDERAL
INITIATIVES TO IMPROVE STATE MEDICAL BOARDS’ PERFORMANCE, OEI-01-93-00020, at 5
(Feb. 1993) (hereinafter, February 1993 OIG Report) (proposing that state medical boards
take a more proactive role in assessing and assuring the quality of medical care after initial
licensure examinations).
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court or law enforcement agency files a report with the medical board.27
The board screens, and, if appropriate, investigates the complaint; if the
board finds the complaint is valid, it may exercise its discretion to pursue
disciplinary action against the physician. Subject to procedural due process
requirements, discipline can range from oral or written reprimand to license
revocation or suspension.28
In addition to procedural due process, medical board proceedings
are also constrained by principles of substantive due process, which limit
the grounds upon which professional discipline can legitimately be
imposed.29 The criteria for licensure and discipline may not be vague,
arbitrary, or unattainable,30 and must have a “rational connection with the
applicant's fitness or capacity to practice” his profession.31 Though the
substantive grounds for professional discipline vary from state to state, most
state medical practice acts authorize discipline for gross incompetence,
physical or mental impairment, alcohol or drug abuse, practicing without a
license or aiding the unlicensed practice of medicine, as well reciprocal
discipline against those providers who have been subject to disciplinary
action in other states. Moreover, most states authorize discipline under a
broad category of “unprofessional conduct,” which may include violations
of codes of medical ethics, conduct that brings the medical profession into
disrepute, or other unspecified forms of “dishonorable conduct,” including
27

See Timothy Jost et al., Consumers, Complaints, and Professional Discipline: A
Look at Medical Licensure Boards, 3 Health Matrix: Journal of Law-Medicine 309, 310-11
(1993); Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General, STATE
MEDICAL BOARDS AND MEDICAL DISCIPLINE, OEI-01-89-00560 (Aug. 1990) (hereinafter,
1990 OIG Report). Many of these reports are also filed with the National Practitioner Data
Bank, a resource maintained by the Department of Health and Human Services that
provides medical boards, hospitals, and other health care entities with “information relating
to the professional competence and conduct” of licensed medical professionals.
Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General, NATIONAL
PRACTITIONER DATA BANK: USEFULNESS AND IMPACT OF REPORTS TO STATE LICENSING
BOARDS, OEI-01-90-00523, at i (Mar. 1993) (hereinafter, March 1993 OIG Report).
28
Id. at 113, notes 76-78.
29
The liberty component of the due process clause includes a right to choose one’s
field of employment, and a medical licensure is thus considered a kind of property right.
Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 121-22 (1889); see also Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S.
286, 291 (1999) (citing Dent).
30
Id.
31
Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1959). See also Dent at
122 (“The nature and extent of the qualifications required must depend primarily upon the
judgment of the State as to their necessity. If they are appropriate to the calling or
profession, and attainable by reasonable study or application, no objection to their validity
can be raised because of their stringency or difficulty. It is only when they have no relation
to such calling or profession, or are unattainable by such reasonable study and application,
that they can operate to deprive one of his right to pursue a lawful vocation..”).
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criminal acts (typically felonies or “crimes of moral turpitude”).32
Because states have broad latitude in determining how best to
exercise their police powers, and because the loss of a medical license does
not implicate a fundamental right, rational basis review is applied when
evaluating the constitutionality of legislation in the realm of medical
licensure and discipline.33 Medical board disciplinary determinations are
reviewed under a similarly deferential standard34
B. Fundamental Principles of Professional Discipline in American Law
The history and structure described above highlight three
fundamental principles grounding medical boards’ disciplinary authority.
Although, as demonstrated in Section III, these principles are not always
reflected in practice, they serve as normative foundations for the delegation
of professional regulatory powers under American law.
First, the primary goal of and justification for professional discipline
is public protection. As an extension of the state’s police power, the
medical board’s disciplinary authority is aimed at protecting medical
consumers from the harms they may incur at the hands of incompetent or
dishonest physicians. This is reflected in the sanctions that may be imposed
on physicians, which range from alerting the medical board and community
of a potential for harm (via a public letter of reprimand) to withdrawing the
physician’s right to practice (delicensure). In other words, the goals of
professional discipline are incapacitation and public protection; professional
discipline does not serve to compensate victims, like civil law; or punish
wrongdoers, like criminal law.35
Secondly, while medical boards’ licensure and disciplinary authority
is grounded in the state’s broad powers to protect public health, safety, and
welfare, this authority is not all-encompassing. It is limited in two ways –
by substance and by degree.
First, substantive due process demands that the grounds for licensure
and discipline be rationally related to the practice of medicine. In other
words, if it is to serve as a meaningful limitation on medical board
32

See, e.g., N.Y. C.L.S. Educ. § 6530(20) (“Conduct in the practice of medicine which
evidences moral unfitness to practice medicine”); § 6530(9).
33
See generally, Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, 348 U.S. 483, 487-88
(1955) (holding that a law “need not be in every respect logically consistent with its aims
488 to be constitutional. It is enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it
might be thought that the particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it.”)
34
See Kinney in Jost, at 114; Barsky v. Board of Regents, 327 U.S. 442, 470 (1954);
Bettencourt v. Board of Registration in Medicine, 904 F.2d 772, 774 (1st Cir. 1990).
35
See Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Character as a Professional Credential, 94 Yale Law
Journal 491, 546 (1985) (noting that the rationale for attorney discipline in not to punish,
but rather to protect the public).
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authority, the substantive due process requirement implies that there are
some criteria that do not satisfy this standard. For example, while requiring
that physicians counsel their patients about the importance of voting in local
and national elections would likely further the public good, it would not be
a proper subject for medical licensure or discipline. As a matter of practice,
the dominance of physicians in the composition of state medical boards
tends to support this understanding. That is, in relying on administrative
boards dominated by physicians for the implementation and enforcement of
licensure and discipline laws, the American system implicitly recognizes
that professional members are better situated to evaluate the unique
question of fitness to practice; a board composed of laypeople would have
much greater difficulty evaluating, for example, whether a licensed
physician’s practice is consistent with the standard of care in his medical
community.
Furthermore, as a matter of degree, professional licensure and
discipline standards are established to ensure a minimal level of
competence, rather than to identify aspirational standards of professional
conduct. That is, the criteria for professional licensure establish a floor
beyond which practitioners may not drop, rather than an ideal towards
which they must strive. In other words, though we view a medical license
as evidence that a physician possesses the basic tools necessary to practice
medicine safely, the license does not ensure that he will actually use these
tools correctly, and does not distinguish the merely competent provider
from the excellent provider – that level of distinction takes place at the
marketplace level. This principle is reflected in fact that our jurisprudence
identifies the professional license as a property right requiring due process
protections, and requires that the standards for licensure and discipline be
reasonably attainable. Though licensure requirements were implemented in
an effort to improve the quality of medical care (and, in turn, public health),
they were bounded by the recognition that imposing excessive regulations
would severely limit the number of licensed physicians available to serve
the community. Enacting overly aspirational or stringent licensure laws,
scholars often note, may have the counterintuitive effect of actually
decreasing public health as compared with a purely free market system.
Accordingly, for the purposes of this Article, I propose a relatively
uncontroversial definition of fitness to practice that is specific enough to be
constructive but does not incorporate too many normative assumptions or
prejudices about appropriate grounds for professional discipline.36 The
definition provides that an individual will be deemed fit to practice
medicine if he possesses the basic qualities needed to practice medicine in a
36

[Consider how thoroughly to address potential challenges to this notion of fitness to
practice, despite its being relatively uncontroversial.]
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manner that does not cause harm to his patients. At a minimum, he must
possess: (a) scientific knowledge of the human body and its functions,
obtained by way of education; (b) the practical skill to implement this
knowledge safely, obtained by way of a residency, fellowship, or other
hands-on experience, as well as the physical ability to do so; and (c) the
moral reasoning needed to understand that his medical knowledge and
experience should not be used to harm patients. In effect, fitness to practice
is best understood as a “toolkit” of basic skills that each professional must
have before he begins practicing. Although the state will grant licenses
only to those who demonstrate that they have the right “tools,” state
licensure cannot ensure that the licensed professionals will always use these
“tools” in the right way.
These guiding principles for professional discipline in American law
should be relatively uncontroversial.
While critics of the current
disciplinary system may question whether these principles accurately
describe the system as it has been implemented in practice, as a matter of
theory, these principles are not only sound, but desirable.
III. PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE BY MEDICAL LICENSING BOARDS:
CHALLENGES AND CONCERNS
Despite the fact that the theoretical underpinnings of the American
medical disciplinary regime are sound, the system as practically
implemented boasts few supporters. Both physicians and critics outside the
professional sphere routinely question medical boards’ disciplinary
priorities and challenge their exercise of disciplinary discretion. Indeed,
many disciplinary actions, particularly those taken in response to physician
misconduct outside the clinical realm, seem to stray from the fundamental
principles of public protection and fitness to practice described previously.
This Section offers a few likely explanations of why medical boards act in
this manner, and concludes that it may be because boards lack clear
guidance as to the proper goals of professional discipline, and are often
pressured by political and public interests to address “noisy” cases of
physician misconduct.
A. Challenging the Frequency and Quality of Medical Board Discipline
The criticisms that have been levied against medical boards
generally fall into two categories. On the one hand, medical professionals
and others concerned with prioritization of board resources criticize boards
for being less responsive to issues of medical safety than to public outcry in
setting disciplinary priorities. Consumer advocates, on the other hand,
charge that as a quantitative matter, boards do not discipline physicians
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often enough to have a substantial impact on patient safety and public
health.37 This Section considers each challenge in turn.
As a historical matter, low rates of professional discipline have been
the primary drivers of public discontent with medical boards.38 Since the
1970’s, critics have argued that medical licensing boards are simply not
doing enough to protect patients. While these challenges have resulted in
some cyclical variation in the frequency of professional discipline39 as well
as legislative broadenings of medical board authority,40 recent estimates
suggest that less than one-half of one percent of licensed physicians face
serious discipline annually.41 Moreover, critics continue to cite high rates
of medical malpractice to support their arguments that professional
discipline is ineffective in protecting the public and improving the quality of
medical care.42 In sum, these criticisms challenge whether boards are
effectively accomplishing the public protection goals of professional
discipline.
On the other hand, boards also face qualitative challenges, primarily
from practicing physicians who have been disciplined for unprofessional
conduct but who contend that their behavior, while possibly indicative of
poor personal judgment or character, is not relevant to their fitness to
practice medicine. Challenged categories of misconduct include tax fraud,43
37

These competing complaints call to mind the old joke memorialized by Woody
Allen in his film, Annie Hall. As his character, Alvy Singer, tells it, “Two elderly women
are at a Catskill mountain resort, and one of them says, "Boy, the food at this place is really
terrible." The other one says, "Yeah, I know; and such small portions."”
38
See Timothy S. Jost, Oversight of the Competence of Healthcare Professionals, in
REGULATION OF THE HEALTHCARE PROFESSIONS (Timothy S. Jost ed. 1997), at 21-22;
Carl F. Ameringer, STATE MEDICAL BOARDS AND THE POLITICS OF PUBLIC PROTECTION
(1999), at 5.
39
See Jost, supra note 38, at 21-22; Ameringer, supra note 38, at 5.
40
See Kevin B. O’Reilly, Doctor Disciplinary Actions Down for Third Year, AM.
MED. NEWS (May 12, 2008) (reporting that Indiana, New Mexico, and Washington enacted
legislation in 2008 to “beef[] up board authority,” and that nine other states are considering
similar changes).
41
See Public Citizen Health Research Group, Ranking of the Rate of State Medical
Boards’ Serious Disciplinary Actions, 2005-2007 (HRG Publication #1837) (2008),
available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/medicalboardtable.pdf; see also Ameringer,
supra note 38, at vi, 2; Jost, supra note 38, at 25 (noting that medical boards are no worse
than other professional licensing boards in addressing disciplinary problems).
42
This sentiment is shared by even some medical board members. See Randall R.
Bovbjerg, Pablo Aliaga & Josephine Gittler, STATE DISCIPLINE OF PHYSICIANS: ASSESSING
STATE MEDICAL BOARDS THROUGH CASE STUDIES (2006), at 33 [hereinafter, State
Discipline of Physicians].
43
See In re Kindschi, 52 Wn.2d 8, 12 (Wash. 1958); Windham v. Board of Medical
Quality Assurance, 104 Cal. App. 3d 461 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 1980) (finding it “difficult to
compartmentalize dishonesty” in such a way that a person who is willing to evade his
federal income taxed would nevertheless be “considered honest in his dealings with his

Draft ~ Do Not Cite Without Permission

A THEORY OF DISCIPLINE

12

soliciting sex in a public restroom,44 possession of marijuana for personal
use,45 reckless driving involving alcohol,46 and witness intimidation.47
Consider, for example, the case of Dr. Ansar, a physician practicing at a
veterans’ hospital who, in the midst of a bitter divorce and custody dispute,
called the police to report that his wife had attacked him with a knife.48 In
fact, Dr. Ansar’s injury was self-inflicted, a feeble attempt to gain
advantage in the legal proceedings.49 When the police arrived and Dr.
Ansar realized that his wife would be handcuffed and taken into custody, he
immediately recanted his statement, but was nevertheless charged and
convicted of filing a false police report.50 Subsequently, the state medical
board suspended his license to practice medicine for a full year on the
grounds that Dr. Ansar had committed a “misdemeanor involving moral
turpitude.”51 The board’s decision was upheld on appeal.52
These cases extend beyond the realm of anecdote, however. Federal
studies by the Office of the Inspector General conducted in the 1980’s and
1990’s concluded that medical boards rarely take action on the basis of
incompetence or poor quality of care, choosing to concentrate instead on
cases of drug diversion, drug or alcohol abuse, and criminal convictions.53
“[W]e’ve never had a disciplinary action based on malpractice,” reported
one medical board director. “[W]hen there is a malpractice case, we tend to
patients.”)
44
See McLaughlin v. Board of Medical Examiners, 35 Cal. App. 3d 1010, 1012 (Cal.
App. 2d Dist. 1973)
45
See Weissbuch v. Board of Medical Examiners, 41 Cal. App. 3d 924 (Cal. App. 2d
Dist. 1974).
46
See Griffiths v. Superior Court, 96 Cal. App. 4th 757 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2002).
47
See McDonnell v. Commission on Medical Discipline, 483 A.2d 76 (Md. 1984)
(reversing a medical board’s decision to discipline a physician who was being sued by a
formed patient for medical malpractice where the physician allegedly engaged in the
intimidation of expert witnesses); In re Lustgarten, 629 S.E.2d 886, 892 (N.C. Ct. App.
2006) (reversing the North Carolina Medical Board’s decision to discipline a physician
testifying as an expert witness for allegedly testifying that another physician was testifying
falsely).
48
Ansar v. State Medical Board of Ohio, 2008 Ohio 3102 (2008).
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id. See Ohio Rev. Code 4731.22(B)(13) (providing that the state medical board
“shall, to the extent permitted by law, limit, revoke, or suspend an individual's certificate to
practice, refuse to register an individual, refuse to reinstate a certificate, or reprimand or
place on probation” a physician who pleads guilty to or is convicted of “a misdemeanor
involving moral turpitude”).
52
Id.
53
Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General, MEDICAL
LICENSURE AND DISCIPLINE: AN OVERVIEW, P-01-86-00064, at 13-14 (June 1986)
(hereinafter, 1986 OIG Report); 1990 OIG Report, at 15.
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look for another basis for disciplinary action.” Furthermore, a more recent
study based on data compiled by the Federation of State Medical Boards
concluded that 25% of all serious medical disciplinary actions taken on the
basis of a physician’s criminal conduct involve conduct that impacts neither
patient care nor the medical system more broadly defined.54 And while
precise figures are hard to come by, recent analyses of the frequency of
various substantive grounds for discipline identify a significant portion that
are not clearly linked to medical care or patient safety.55 Critics contend
that disciplining physicians for these kinds of misconduct emphasizes
aspirational standards, rather than standards that are clearly linked to public
protection in the medical sphere.
While both the qualitative and quantitative challenges are important
to recognize, this Article focuses primarily on the qualitative challenges for
three reasons. First, because an unmediated focus on the rate of medical
discipline alone is unlikely to tell us much about boards’ overall
effectiveness in protecting public interests.56 The rate at which medical
professionals face serious discipline is comparable to the rate of discipline
in other professions57 as well as the rate of felony convictions among the
American public.58 Giving these quantitative similarities, it is surprising
that medical discipline alone would be subject to such criticism.59
Secondly, given that the frequency of board discipline is significantly
resource-driven,60 modifying boards’ disciplinary priorities is likely to be
more effective than pushing for increased rates of discipline when resources
are scarce. Imagine the potential impact if all the resources spent by
54

P. Jung, P. Lurie & S. M. Wolfe, US Physicians Disciplined for Criminal Activity,
16 Health Matrix: Journal of Law-Medicine 335 (2006).
55
Grant and Alfred, at 875 [insert parenthetical with data from Table 2]
56
See, e.g., Grant and Alfred at 872 (“[I]t would be preferable not to assess board
effectiveness by the rate of discipline alone.”); Timothy Jost et al., Consumers,
Complaints, and Professional Discipline: A Look at Medical Licensure Boards, 3 Health
Matrix: Journal of Law-Medicine 309, 310 ([C]ounts of disciplinary actions … do not give
us a full picture of board activity.”), 336 (“[E]valuating board success solely on the basis of
formal disciplinary actions is inadequate because boards may be more active at the
informal level than is commonly supposed.”).
57
See Jost, supra note 38, at 25.
58
According to the U.S. Department of Justice, nearly 1,145,000 adults were convicted
of felonies in 2004. U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Criminal
Sentencing Statistics, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/sent.htm. This represents
less than one half of one percent of the United States population.
59
Moreover, consider these data in terms of numbers rather than percentages. If each
of the 3,000 physicians seriously disciplined each year sees an average of 3,000 patients
annually, then at least 9 million patient interactions are at risk annually. See David
Goodman, Twenty-Year Trends in Regional Variations in the U.S. Physician Workforce,
Health Affairs (Oct. 7, 2004).
60
See infra, Section III-B.
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medical boards in disciplining character-related misconduct occurring
outside the clinical sphere were instead redirected to address behavior with
a more direct impact on patient health and welfare (for example,
substandard care).61 Finally, evaluating boards on the basis of specific
disciplinary actions is easier and likely to be more productive than
considering the many actions that medical boards fail to take. Because
many of the “noisy” cases relating to character and professionalism test
constitutional boundaries and ultimately face judicial scrutiny, they offer
unique opportunities for clarifying the boundaries of permissible board
discipline. The lessons learned in these cases can then be used to provide
guidance for professional discipline in other contexts as well.
B. Underlying Issues: Finance and Structural Independence
If medical boards are failing to achieve the public goals with which
they’ve been tasked, it is imperative to understand why this is the case
before proposing any solutions. While at least one prominent legal scholar
has explored the motivations of state bar examiners in investigating attorney
character,62 no similar studies have been done of state medical boards.63
Accordingly, there is little consensus as to why medical boards choose to
pursue discipline against certain kinds of physician misconduct but not
others. That said, at least a few potential explanations have been proposed.
According to a 2006 report prepared for the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services, high costs and limited financial and human
resources are among the major obstacles to effective disciplinary
enforcement by medical boards.64 Because of these resource limitations,
boards generally take a reactive rather than proactive approach to medical
discipline, and are often unable to investigate all the complaints that are
made against physicians, necessarily triaging those of highest priority while
leaving others unexamined.65 A recent empirical study seemed to confirm
this finding, noting a correlation between the extent of a board’s financial
61

[Consider counterargument about relative cost of pursuing discipline against
criminal conduct vs. negligent practice]
62
Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Character as a Professional Credential, 94 Yale Law
Journal 491 (1985).
63
The only study that addresses similar themes in the medical context is Randall R.
Bovbjerg, Pablo Aliaga & Josephine Gittler, State Discipline of Physicians: Assessing
State Medical Boards Through Case Studies (U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services 2006), http://aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/2006/stdiscp.pdf.
64
Bovbjerg at 15-17, 38-41. See also Robert C. Derbyshire, How Effective is Medical
Self-Regulation?, 7 Law and Human Behavior 193, 199 (1983); 1990 OIG Report, 6-8;
1986 OIG Report, 2.
64
Bovbjerg at 9, 14-15.
65
Bovbjerg at 21, 35.
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resources and its rate of discipline.66 These reports suggest that increasing
medical boards’ budgets would go a long way towards increasing the
frequency of medical discipline. Moreover, to the extent that boards choose
to pursue certain substantive categories of discipline rather than others on
the basis of financial limitations – relying on court reports to identify
physicians who have been convicted of criminal activity, for example, is
likely to be less costly and labor-intensive than actively investigating
physicians who provide medical care that consistently falls short of
professional standards67 – perhaps increasing board resources might have an
impact on the quality, not just the quantity, of professional discipline.
Another common explanation for medical boards’ lax approach to
professional discipline is that the boards are “captured” by professional
interests or otherwise lack meaningful public oversight.68 Indeed, one of
the most prominent criticisms of the medical profession in the 20th century
has been that it is self-protective, monopolistic, and more attuned to the
economic security of its members than to the welfare of the public at
large.69 In the context of medical discipline, some have argued that the
boards’ approaches to various substantive grounds for discipline are
likewise driven by internal constraints within the medical community – for
example, the push to improve the public standing of physicians by
emphasizing their moral superiority (which, compared to their technical
skill, is much easier for laypersons to judge).
While there can be no denying that the history of American
medicine is replete with examples of professional self-protection by the
AMA and other private professional associations (as well as by individual
physicians),70 it is not clear that these problems affect the physicians
66

M. T. Law & Z. K. Hansen, Medical Licensing Board Characteristics and Physician
Discipline: An Empirical Analysis. See also Andis Robeznieks, Am. Med. News (quoting
NY Health Department spokeswoman saying that increase in NY discipline was partly due
to a double in licensing fees). Possibly add note about source of medical board funding.
67
See Bovbjerg; 1990 OIG Report, 10, 15 (noting that because quality of care inquiries
tend to be time-consuming, “boards tend to look for another basis to take action.”); 1986
OIG Report, 14. Moreover, financial limitations mean that boards are often reactive rather
than proactive, responding to consumer complaints or criminal reports, rather than
initiating investigation on their own.
68
See Bovbjerg at 45; Harris S. Cohen, On Professional Power and Conflict of
Interest: State Licensing Boards on Trial, 5 Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 291
(1980). See also Robert C. Derbyshire, How Effective is Medical Self-Regulation?, 7 Law
and Human Behavior 193, 199-200 (1983) (citing Harris Cohen, Milton Friedman).
69
See generally, PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
MEDICINE, 223 (1984) (discussing medicine’s historical opposition to the establishment of
independent regulatory schemes for professionals such as midwives, chiropractors, and
osteopaths).
70
See, e.g., Matter of the Am. Med. Ass’n., 94 F.T.C. 701 (1979) (prohibiting medical
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serving on state medical boards. Arguably, the attitude of a physician
appointed by the governor to sit as a member of the state agency responsible
for interpreting and enforcing the state’s medical practice act is likely to be
very different than that of the average practicing physician.71 Indeed, the
2006 Health and Human Services report posited that medical boards may
actually be able to act more effectively if they maintain statutory and
structural independence from both political and professional interests. 72
And a similar report dated 1990 identified state limitations on board
authority as one of the most significant obstacles to expeditious and
effective disciplinary review.73 A recent empirical study of the frequency of
medical board discipline across various states agreed, finding that boards
were more likely to take disciplinary action when they were more
structurally independent from state government;74 boards with a higher
proportion of public (that is, non-professional) members were found to be
no more likely to engage in vigorous disciplinary enforcement.75 These
data ultimately led the authors of the study to conclude that claims that “the
medical profession has captured the regulatory apparatus” have been
“overstated.”76
C. Lack of Legislative or Judicial Guidance
The three issues described above – financial constraints,
professional self-protection, and lack of independence, are unlikely to be
resolved without significant political and professional buy-in.77 However,
the boards responsible for professional discipline also face another
significant challenge that can be more easily resolved – namely, a lack of
associations and state medical boards from enforcing their ethical guidelines regarding
advertisement and price fixing); Wilk v. Am. Med. Ass'n, 895 F.2d 352, 360 (7th Cir.
1990) (upholding district court’s finding that the AMA violated federal antitrust laws by
conspiring to eliminate the chiropractic profession). [Add references to Tuskegee,
Nuremberg, etc.]
71
See Bovbjerg at 34; Derbyshire at 198-99.
72
Bovbjerg at 9, 12-14, 14-15.
73
1990 OIG Report, 8-9.
74
Law and Hansen.
75
Law and Hansen. See also Andis Robeznieks, Public Active on Medical Boards, But
Not Always Tougher on Doctors. Am. Med. News Nov. 11, 2002 (noting that the
Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana medical boards have physician-only membership, and
have “some of the most aggressive disciplinary rates.”)
76
Law and Hansen at 5.
77
Increasing funding and structural independence, for example, would require strong
support from state legislatures and executives. Reducing the profession’s self-protective
instincts, on the other hand, would take a significant amount of buy-in from the profession
that is, quite frankly, unlikely to happen. See Robert C. Derbyshire, How Effective is
Medical Self-Regulation?, 7 Law and Human Behavior 193, 199 (1983).
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clear direction in setting disciplinary priorities. Existing legal doctrine has
neither adequately defined fitness to practice nor resolved the question of
why personal character is relevant to safe and effective medical practice, so
it is no wonder that boards face challenges in exercising their disciplinary
discretion in a principled manner.
As noted in Section II, legislatures grant medical boards disciplinary
authority pursuant to broadly worded medical practice acts authorizing
discipline for, among other things, “unprofessional conduct.”78 Although
such language seems to provide little guidance for medical boards engaged
in concrete disciplinary decisionmaking, courts have consistently upheld
such broad categories of discipline, finding that they provide boards with
the flexibility and discretion necessary to effectuate public goals.79 The
North Carolina Supreme Court, for example, has consistently upheld
unprofessional conduct statutes against challenges of vagueness and
overbreadth.80 While acknowledging that there may be “room for
difference of opinion” as to the outer edges of the concepts of
“unprofessional” or “dishonorable” conduct, the court stated that “there is at
and around the central core of these concepts much conduct which so
clearly constitutes improper practice that few, if any, members of the
profession would seriously claim to be unaware that such conduct is not
consistent with these concepts.”81 Rather than impose upon states the
burden of cataloging “every conceivable improper practice in which the
licensee is forbidden to engage,” the court held that unprofessional conduct
statutes be evaluated by reference to the test of “whether a reasonably
intelligent member of the profession would understand that the conduct in
question is forbidden.”82 Similarly, the Washington Supreme Court upheld
a statute authorizing professional discipline for “moral turpitude” against a
78

See supra, Section II.
As Justice Frankfurter wrote in Schware, the fact that the definition of moral
character "has shadowy rather than precise bounds" and its determination "involves an
exercise of delicate judgment” does not imply that a state may not require it as a condition
of practice. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 248-49 (1959). For state
court decisions rejecting vagueness challenges to professional discipline statutes, see, e.g.,
Brody v. Barasch, 155 Vt. 103 (1990) (“moral unfitness”); Ketring v. Sturges, 372 S.W.2d
104, 111 (Mo. 1963) ("dishonorable conduct"); Haley v. Medical Disciplinary Bd., 818
P.2d 1062, 1072-74 (Wash. 1991) (“moral turpitude”); Abrahamson v. Department of
Professional Regulation, 568 N.E.2d 1319, 1324 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1991) (“good moral
character”), rev’d on other grounds, 606 N.E.2d 111 (Ill. 1992); Sanchick v. Michigan
State Board of Examiners, 342 Mich. 555 (Mich. 1955) (“unprofessional, unethical and
dishonest conduct of a character likely to deceive the public”).
80
See, e.g., In re Wilkins, 294 N.C. 528, 548 (N.C. 1978); In re Guess, 327 N.C. 46,
56 (1990)
81
In re Wilkins, 294 N.C. 528, 548 (N.C. 1978).
82
In re Wilkins, 294 N.C. 528, 548 (N.C. 1978).
79
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vagueness challenge, noting that when the statute is “construed in relation
to the purposes of professional discipline, considered in the context of a
specific application, and supplemented by the shared knowledge and
understanding of medical practitioners,” its content is sufficiently clear to
put practitioners on notice that certain conduct is prohibited.83
And yet, most courts attempting to define fitness to practice or
explain how a particular category of professional misconduct relates to
fitness are able to offer little more than circular reasoning in support of their
conclusions. As noted by Deborah Rhode in her paradigmatic 1985 article
on moral character as a credential for the practice of law, what passes for
legal analysis in these cases is highly conclusory and “border[s] on
tautology.”84 Even Hawker v. New York, the case which speaks most
directly to the issue of character-related criteria for professional licensure
and discipline, offers little guidance. In Hawker, the Supreme Court upheld
a New York state law prohibiting the practice of medicine by those who
have been convicted of a felony, but provided little support for its
conclusion that personal character is “as important a qualification as
knowledge" for professional practice and is therefore subject to discipline.85
In two brief sentences, the Court offered the following meager explanation
of its conclusion: “The physician is one whose relations to life and health
are of the most intimate character. It is fitting, not merely that he should
possess a knowledge of diseases and their remedies, but also that he should
be one who may safely be trusted to apply those remedies.”86 While these
factors serve to emphasize the importance of disciplining physicians
compared to other professionals,87 they do not satisfactorily explain why
any particular grounds for discipline are appropriate. Indeed, most state
83

Haley v. Medical Disciplinary Bd., 818 P.2d 1062, 1074 (Wash. 1991)
Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Character as a Professional Credential, 94 Yale Law
Journal 491, 552 (1985).
85
Hawker v. N.Y., 170 U.S. 189, 193 (1898). Because the Supreme Court decided
Hawker decades before it elucidated the fitness to practice requirement in Schware, the
analysis in Hawker does not lend itself to an easy discussion of the connection between
personal character and fitness to practice medicine.
86
Id. at 194, 191 (No business “so directly affect[s] the lives and health of the people”
as the practice of medicine); In re Kindschi, 319 P.2d 824, 826 (Wash. 1958) (“The daily
practice of medicine concerns life and death consequences to members of the public”).
87
See also Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 247 (1959) (In his
concurrence, Justice Frankfurter wrote that because the legal profession is charged with the
important responsibilities of “defen[ding] right and … ward[ing] off wrong,” it is
particularly important that members of the profession have "a high sense of honor, [be] of
granite discretion, [and] of the strictest observance of fiduciary responsibility.”); In re Polk,
449 A.2d 7, 18 (N.J. 1982) (describing the less stringent burden of proof in medical
disciplinary proceedings compared to legal disciplinary proceedings as reflecting “society’s
important interest in life and health”).
84
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court decisions in disciplinary matters simply conclude that moral character
broadly defined is a necessary component of fitness to practice without
providing adequate support for this assertion.88
Substantive due process challenges to medical board disciplinary
actions taken on the basis of unprofessional conduct statutes have resulted
in equally unhelpful judicial analysis. Without providing strong
justifications for their decisions, courts have held that professional
discipline on grounds as varied as tax fraud,89 failure to facilitate review of
child support obligations,90 soliciting sex in a public restroom,91 possession
of marijuana for personal use,92 and reckless driving involving alcohol93 all
fall within the boundaries of unprofessional conduct statutes and are
reasonably related to the practice of medicine. Consider, for example, In re
Kindschi, a Washington Supreme Court case that set the precedent for
numerous cases upholding medical discipline on character-related
grounds.94 In Kindschi, the Washington Supreme Court upheld a medical
board’s decision to suspend the license of a physician who had committed
tax fraud, on the basis of a statute authorizing discipline for “unprofessional
conduct,” including "conviction in any court of any offense involving moral
turpitude."95 Finding “a rational connection between income tax fraud and
one's fitness of character or trustworthiness to practice medicine,” the court
held that the board’s discipline for tax fraud did not violate due process.96
In justifying its decision on the grounds that the public “has a right to
expect the highest degree of trustworthiness of the members of the medical
88

See, e.g., Dittman v. California, 191 F.3d 1020, 1032 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Schware
and concluding that “a state may require good moral character as a qualification for entry
into a profession, when the practitioners of the profession come into close contact with
patients or clients”); Raymond v. Board of Registration in Medicine, 443 N.E.2d 391, 395
(Mass. 1982) (“A physician's bad moral character may reasonably call into question his
ability to practice medicine.”); Foster v. Bd. of Medical Quality Assurance, 227 Cal. App.
3d 1606, 1610 (Cal. App. 3d Dist. 1991) (a physician’s “intentional dishonesty” regarding
his malpractice coverage “demonstrates a fundamental lack of moral character which is
incompatible with the honesty required to properly maintain the doctor-patient
relationship”).
89
In re Kindschi, 52 Wn.2d 8, 12 (Wash. 1958); Windham v. Board of Medical
Quality Assurance, 104 Cal. App. 3d 461 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 1980).
90
Dittman v. California, 191 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. Cal. 1999).
91
McLaughlin v. Board of Medical Examiners, 35 Cal. App. 3d 1010, 1012 (Cal. App.
2d Dist. 1973)
92
Weissbuch v. Board of Medical Examiners, 41 Cal. App. 3d 924 (Cal. App. 2d Dist.
1974).
93
Griffiths v. Superior Court, 96 Cal. App. 4th 757 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2002).
94
See, e.g., Deatherage v. Board. of Psychology, 948 P.2d 828 (Wash. 1997)
(improper witness testimony).
95
In re Kindschi, 319 P.2d 824, 825 (Wash. 1958).
96
Id. at 826.
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profession,”97 the Washington Supreme Court effectively paved the way for
professional discipline against physicians who engage in any conduct
suggesting untrustworthiness or violating “sound standards of conduct.”98
Of course, there are good reasons for legislatures to grant medical
boards such broad authority and for courts to defer to board decisions
provided they satisfy a reasonableness test. On the legislative side, given
that professional expectations are likely to evolve over time and across
various contexts, it would be problematic if unprofessional conduct statutes
were drafted to capture specific and defined instances of misconduct, rather
than offer a significant degree of flexibility. Moreover, granting medical
boards broad directives and allowing them to make judgments on their own
without overly stringent judicial review is consistent with the principles of
professional discipline that provide for physician-dominated boards as best
suited to identify and enforce professional standards.99 While such a
deferential stance may be appropriate as a matter of both law and policy, the
meagerness of judicial discussion in professional discipline cases makes it
difficult for boards to derive clear principles and guidelines for future
action. By failing to provide a fuller analysis in substantive due process
cases, courts are missing a key opportunity to explain to boards why the
boundaries of constitutional action lie where they do.
Given the lack of guidance provided to boards by the legislatures in
their initial grant of disciplinary authority and by the courts in their judicial
review of disciplinary decisions, it is no wonder that the disciplinary actions
taken by state medical boards are sometimes inconsistent with the principles
of professional discipline. In the absence of legislative or judicial guidance,
boards are free to take action based not on sound theories of discipline, but
on the pressures imposed by public officials, private interests, and the
public, none of which are necessarily the best drivers of administrative
decisionmaking. This Article seeks to remedy this problem by clarifying
the principles of professional discipline and proposing a theory that boards
can use to prioritize action in the realm of character-related misconduct and
beyond.
IV. THE CORE VALUES THEORY OF MEDICAL DISCIPLINE: CONCEPT AND
APPLICATION
As described above, the modern system of medical discipline does
not adequately take into account the fundamental principles of professional
discipline outlined in Section II. This Section proposes an alternative
97

Id.
Id.
99
See supra, section II.
98
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theory of discipline for professional misconduct that more appropriately
accounts for these concerns – namely, one that focuses on the core
professional values inherent in the most elemental understanding of fitness
to practice. Medical boards that wish to operate more effectively ought to
be guided by this theory in setting disciplinary priorities and exercising their
disciplinary discretion.
A. Respect For Core Medical Values as an Element of Fitness to Practice
To satisfy the fundamental principles outlined in Section II-B,
professional discipline must not only be aimed primarily at public
protection, but must also be appropriately targeted at issues of fitness to
practice narrowly defined. A theory of discipline that does not incorporate
these limitations is of little value to medical boards struggling to determine
what kinds of disciplinary actions they can pursue consistent with their legal
directives. In contrast, a theory of discipline built to accommodate narrow
character-based elements of fitness to practice can be extremely helpful to
medical boards seeking disciplinary guidance.
As described in Section II, even the most elemental definitions of
fitness to practice encompass not only educational and training
requirements, but also some aspects of moral reasoning, character, or
professionalism. However, most medical boards’ interpretation of the
character- or professionalism-based element of fitness to practice is so
expansive that it begs the question of whether there exists any kind of
physician misconduct that actually falls outside the scope of the fitness to
practice inquiry. Clearly, some limitations must be imposed on disciplinary
inquiries into character or professionalism.100 A core values-based theory
of discipline, which posits that the only relevant moral question is whether a
physician demonstrates respect for the core values of medical practice,
serves this function well. Pursuant to this theory, medical boards concerned
with professionalism and character ought to identify these core medical
values, and then pursue discipline only against those physicians whose
behavior demonstrates disrespect for those values.
This approach is consistent with the reasoning that some courts have
adopted in reviewing medical board disciplinary actions. While courts are
reluctant to require proof of good character generally as an element of
fitness to practice, they are more inclined to uphold professional discipline
against physicians who demonstrate their disrespect for foundational
medical values that are components of the fitness to practice inquiry.101
100

See, supra, Section II-B.
Griffiths v. Superior Court 96 Cal.App.4th 757 (2002) (noting that driving under
the influence of alcohol “threatens personal safety and places the safety of the public in
jeopardy”); In the Matter of the Revocation of the License of Irwin Jacob Polk 90 N.J. 550
101
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Among the key values and characteristics that judges have suggested bear a
direct connection to the practice of medicine, honesty,102 compliance with
the law,103 adherence to fiduciary principles,104 and respect for life, health,
and bodily integrity105 have all been identified as relevant to fitness to
practice and, in turn, medical discipline.106 Consider, for example, the
thorough reasoning engaged in by a California court in upholding board
discipline of a physician convicted of driving under the influence of
alcohol. The court in Griffiths, rather than making a summary statement
that driving under the influence is indicative of poor character and therefore
a proper subject of discipline, wrote a nuanced opinion carefully identifying
the various ways in which the physician’s behavior demonstrated a lack of
cognitive or moral skills necessary for medical practice.107 Among the
physician’s demonstrated faults, noted the court, were disrespect for legal
prohibitions against drinking and driving, the failure to apply scientific
knowledge regarding the speed at which alcohol is absorbed into the
bloodstream, and a lack of concern for his own bodily safety and that of
(1982) (noting that sexual abuse of patients results in psychological harm).
102
See, e.g., Windham v. Board of Medical Quality Assurance, 104 Cal. App. 3d 461
(Cal. App. 2d Dist. 1980) (noting that forensic medical practice involves honesty in
financial dealings with the government and private insurance carriers, honesty in reporting
and testifying as to medical matters, and honesty and integrity in patient dealings); Griffiths
v. Superior Court 96 Cal.App.4th 757 (2002) (“Honesty and integrity are deeply and daily
involved in various aspects of the practice of medicine”); In Re License Issued to Zahl, 186
N.J. 341(2006) (holding that the “panoply of dishonest acts” committed by the physician,
including insurance fraud, “bespeak a fundamental disregard for truth which is ultimately
inimical to the practice of medicine.”); Krain v. Medical Board, 71 Cal.App.4th 1416
(1999) (“the intentional solicitation to commit a crime which has as its hallmark an act of
dishonesty [perjury] cannot be divorced from the obligation of utmost honesty and integrity
to the patients whom the physician counsels”).
103
Griffiths v. Superior Court 96 Cal.App.4th 757 (2002) (noting that driving under
the influence of alcohol “shows an inability or unwillingness to obey the legal prohibition
against drinking and driving and constitutes a serious breach of a duty owed to society.”).
104
In re Lesansky, 25 Cal. 4th 11, 16 (Cal. 2001) (identifying among the character
traits necessary for the practice of law: trustworthiness, honesty, fairness, candor, and
fidelity to fiduciary duties).
105
Griffiths v. Superior Court, 96 Cal. App. 4th 757, 770 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2002).
(“Alcohol consumption quickly affects normal driving ability, and driving under the
influence of alcohol threatens personal safety and places the safety of the public in
jeopardy.”)
106
Similar values, particularly the value of compliance with and respect for the law,
may be relevant in reviewing bar discipline of attorneys. While compliance with the law is
arguably an even more important value for the legal profession, see Rhode at 570
(“Abolitionists, civil rights activists, suffragists and labor organizers – indeed, the
architects of our constitutional framework – all were guilty of ‘disrespect for law’ in
precisely the sense that bar examiners employ it.”).
107
Griffiths v. Superior Court, 96 Cal. App. 4th 757 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2002).
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other drivers on the roads.108 The conclusion reached by this court and
others is that, if a physician’s conduct in his personal life demonstrates a
failure to understand or respect the values essential to safe and effective
medical practice, professional discipline may be appropriate. On the other
hand, professional values that are non-essential or aspirational in nature
may be enforced as social norms within the medical profession, but are not
an appropriate subject for legal discipline.109
B. Challenges in Application
The benefit of the core values theory of discipline is that it gives
direction to medical boards as to the appropriate exercise of disciplinary
discretion, while still offering boards significant flexibility in applying this
standard. Unfortunately, this promising element of the theory is also the
primary criticism against it. From defining core professional values to
determining what kind of behavior implicates those values, this theory
offers boards a great deal of discretion, on its face doing little to solve the
problem of boards’ unbridled exercise of disciplinary authority.
Under the core values theory, the strongest predictor of substantive
grounds for discipline will be the value or values that are identified as
essential to medical practice. Defining these values too broadly will
exclude many physicians who are arguably fit to practice medicine;
defining them too narrowly will allow practice by physicians who may be at
a greater risk of harming patients.110 Unfortunately, there is little empirical
research indicating which professional values are closely linked to safe
medical practice and patient safety. Accordingly, boards have little but
common sense to turn to in identifying and selecting professional values,
citing values as diverse as honesty, compliance with the law, adherence to
fiduciary principles, and respect for life, health, and bodily integrity.
Consider, for example, how disciplinary outcomes might differ if
various state medical boards were to identify different core professional
values as essential to medical practice. If a board were to determine that
respect for physical health and welfare is a value essential to the safe
practice of medicine, then professional discipline would be justified against
a physician convicted of assault and battery in a bar fight, on the grounds
that his violent conduct indicates a lack of respect for others’ physical
health and welfare. In contrast, if another board deemed honesty essential,
108

Id.
See generally, David Luban, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY (1988),
128 (distinguishing between essential components of the professional’s role and mere “side
constraints”).
110
Moreover, the choice of who defines the values – boards, legislators, or courts –
will be of great normative significance.
109
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discipline might be justified upon a showing of any dishonest behavior by a
physician in his personal relationships – for example, lying about his
address to get his child into a good public school. Where there is little
consensus in identifying the core values essential for fitness to practice,
there is also likely to be little consensus among boards as to the proper
substantive grounds for professional discipline.
Moreover, even if there were widespread agreement about which
values are essential components of fitness to practice, controversy would
still arise in determining what kind of behavior implicates those values.
Consider, for example, if medical boards, legislators, and the public alike all
determined that “respect for human life” was one core value that all
physicians needed to possess in demonstrating fitness to practice medicine.
A decisionmaker called upon to identify prohibited behavior that indicates
disrespect for life might authorize professional discipline for elective
abortions, physician assisted suicide, voluntary and involuntary euthanasia,
lethal injection, as well as crimes of murder and manslaughter that take
place outside the clinical sphere. Although in all of these cases, as a
definitional matter, a life is ended at the hands of a medical professional, it
is important to note that there is widespread debate within the medical
community about what it means to value life and whether activities such as
physician assisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia do, in fact, indicate a
lack of respect for life.111 Similarly, identifying “respect for physical health
and welfare” as a core medical value would be equally fraught with
controversy. While it is clear that physical assault and sexual abuse of
patients demonstrates a lack of respect for bodily integrity, what about
voluntary amputation and female circumcision, which are touted by some
physicians and communities as legitimate ways of respecting patient
values? For any value that is identified as relevant to professional practice,
decisionmakers will still likely disagree about its proper application in the
disciplinary context.
C. Consensus for Fiduciary Duty as a Core Medical Value
A partial solution to these problems may be found if we can identify
a relatively uncontroversial professional value that the state, the public, and
the profession can agree is a core component of medical practice. While
there may still be disagreement about how this value is expressed in
personal conduct, any consensus that can be reached in identifying relevant
111

For example, supporters of physician assisted suicide argue that the role of the
physician is not to preserve life at all costs, but rather to value the patient’s conception of a
good life, which may in some cases involve facilitating his death. Physicians who support
abortions, for example, might argue that respect for human life does not require the
preservation of an unwanted fetal life at the expense of an adult mother’s health or welfare.
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values is likely to serve an important function in defining the boundaries of
disciplinary inquiry.
The principle of fiduciary duty in professional practice serves this
function well. Principles of fiduciary duty establish that fiduciaries
entrusted with the care of vulnerable populations have a duty to act in the
best interests of their beneficiaries, and must not use their positions of
authority to benefit themselves or others at the beneficiaries’ expense. Both
in medicine and law, professionals and clients both recognize the
importance of the fiduciary duty; indeed scholars have identified as one of
the distinguishing characteristics of professions the fact that they have “a
credible code of fiduciary ethics that is effectively enforced.”112 Moreover,
courts commonly call on principles of fiduciary duty to justify professional
boards’ disciplinary decisions and to demonstrate why the right to practice a
profession should not be granted to those who demonstrate that they are
likely to abuse that right. For example, the Supreme Court in Hawker
culled citations to state statutes and court decisions suggesting that
physicians, even if technically competent, might abuse their positions of
power in ways that are harmful to patients if they promise impossible cures,
collect fees for ineffective treatments, or abuse patient confidences.113 One
state court cited in Hawker expressed concern that the “unprincipled and
vicious” not be given the right the right to “enter professionally the families
of the worthy but unsuspecting and be admitted to the secrets which the sick
chamber must often intrust to them.”114 Later opinions cite similar concerns
about potential abuses of professional power, particularly relating to issues
of confidentiality and privacy.115
If the principle of fiduciary duty is used to narrow the scope of
character-related inquiry for professional discipline, the next step is to ask
112

Michael J. Polelle, Who's on First, and What's a Professional?, 32 U. S.F. L. Rev.
205 (1998).
113
Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, at 191 note 1, 194-95 (1898).
114
Id. at 194-95.
115
See, e.g., Shea v. Board of Medical Examiners, 146 Cal.Rptr. 653, 662 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1978) (“[T]here is no other profession in which one passes so completely within the
power and control of another as does the medical patient.”); Hughes v. State Board of
Medical Examiners, 134 S.E. 42, 47 (Ga. 1926) (“[T]he relation of physician and patient is
of such a confidential and serious nature, that not only the skill but also the moral character
of the physician is of great importance to the interest of the patient and the state. It is
important that only men of good character should practice medicine.”); Meffert v. State
Board of Medical Registration & Examination 72 P. 247, 249 (Kan. 1903) (“The object
sought is the protection of the home of the sick and distressed from the intrusion therein, in
a professional character, of vicious and unprincipled men - men wholly destitute of all
moral sensibilities. It was not the purpose of the lawmakers to clothe a man with a
certificate of moral character, and send him out to prey upon the weak and unsuspecting upon those who would be entirely at his mercy[.]”).
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how this approach would play out in practice. Generally speaking, there are
three categories of physician misconduct that are likely to implicate
fiduciary principles. First, where a physician uses his clinical skills to cause
harm to a patient or other beneficiary – consider physician assisted suicide,
voluntary and involuntary euthanasia, lethal injection, torture, or
irresponsible prescription of controlled drugs.116 Second, where a physician
uses his privileged position (but not his clinical skills) to cause harm to a
patient or other beneficiary – consider sexual abuse of patients that is
facilitated by the privacy of the doctor-patient encounter, and breaches of
patient confidentiality. Third, where a physician uses his privileged
position to benefit himself without regard for his patient or other beneficiary
- consider false expert testimony, Medicaid fraud, pharmacy theft, or even
exceeding the speed limit on the basis of a nonexistent medical emergency.
The common factor in all three scenarios is the physician’s abuse of his
clinical skills or privileged position, by virtue of which he is granted unique
access to vulnerable beneficiaries in the first place.117 Importantly, this
approach categorically excludes some kinds of personal misconduct as
irrelevant to questions of professional discipline – namely, those that do not
implicate the physician’s clinical skills or privileged status, including many
crimes that take place outside of the professional sphere (such as assault,
murder, and fraud against non-patients), many instances of financial
mismanagement or tax fraud in the personal sphere (such as failure to make
child support payments), as well as simply poor personal judgment (such as
marital infidelity). If professional discipline for these kinds of misconduct
is to be justified, it must be because they implicate some other professional
value essential to the practice of medicine.
However, relying on fiduciary principles to narrow the scope of
disciplinary inquiry is only a partial solution, because even the
uncontroversial value of fiduciary duty suffers from conflicts in
interpretation. There are normative implications as to how harm is defined
and how beneficiaries are identified, and the malleability of these terms
poses problems for the effective implementation of fiduciary principles as a
limiting category for professional discipline. For example, much depends
116

In each of these cases, the physician’s medical expertise is used to achieve a result
that is, according to some, harmful to a fiduciary. In physician assisted suicide, for
example, the physician uses his knowledge of pharmaceuticals and his right to prescribe
them to assist in the death of a patient. In drug abuse cases, the physician uses those same
skills in a way that arguably harms both the patient and any third parties to whom the
patient diverts excess drugs. In abortion cases, the physician terminates the life of an
unborn fetus by using his clinical skills.
117
Another line of inquiry might consider whether discipline would be appropriate
against a physician who breaches his fiduciary obligations in a context unrelated to the
practice of medicine (for example, as a trustee of a family trust).
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on whether the patient is considered the physician’s only beneficiary, or
whether the physician is understood to be a fiduciary for society more
broadly.118 Defining the fiduciary role of the physician to include parties
other than the patient might justify disciplining physicians who perform
abortions, those who fail to report a patient’s infectious disease, and those
who provide biased expert testimony, on the grounds that they are using
their clinical skills or privileged positions to harm a third-party beneficiary.
Likewise, the question of whether a physician’s conduct results in harm
depends greatly on the definition of harm. As explained above, some may
argue that assisting a terminally ill patient’s voluntary suicide does not
constitute a harm, while others may argue that ending a person’s life always
constitutes a harm to that patient. Still others might take the position that
even if physician assisted suicide is not harmful to the patient, it can result
in harm to society or other third-party beneficiaries. Similar arguments
could be made for participation in activities that are deemed harmful by
some but not by others, including female circumcision, voluntary
amputation, and prescription of medical marijuana.
D.
Benefits of the Core Values Theory
Ultimately, then, even if there is widespread support for using the
value of respect for fiduciary principles to narrow the scope of justifiable
professional discipline, open questions of definition and interpretation make
it an incomplete solution at best. That said, there are some very real
benefits to be gained by using a professional values analysis at every level
of action, whether by legislators determining grounds for professional
discipline, medical boards reviewing professional misconduct, or courts
reviewing board disciplinary actions.
First, using a values-based approach that emphasizes fiduciary duty
will rid the disciplinary process of a significant degree of uncertainty and
increase the likelihood of consistency in outcomes over time. Currently,
physicians aren’t being put on notice as to what kind conduct will subject
them to discipline; boards aren’t getting adequate guidance from the courts
about the constitutional limitations on professional discipline; and courts
have very little principled jurisprudence to look to in evaluating due process
challenges. Given the fact that many state legislatures are currently moving
to expand the scope of medical boards’ disciplinary authority in response to
public concerns, it is particularly important that this authority be exercised
in a principled way. Using a medical values analysis that recognizes the
importance of fiduciary duty, although it won’t be outcome-determinative,
will help determine some categories of conduct that are relevant to
118

[Insert citations to articles discussing broader physician fiduciary duties, especially
in the context of public health.]
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disciplinary inquiries, and will categorically exclude others – for example,
many non-violent felonies.
Secondly, to the extent that boards have been criticized for taking an
inconsistent approach to medical discipline – imposing lesser sanctions on
providers who engage in tax fraud than those who engage in Medicare
fraud119 – applying this kind of principled analysis may help redeem them
in the eyes of the public. It will set the stage for a more principled
application of constitutional principles of due process in the context of
professional discipline, which will help to ensure that medical boards
exercise their disciplinary discretion in a manner that best serves the public
interest.
Finally, and most importantly, using a professional values analysis
to reprioritize medical boards’ actions will free up boards’ limited resources
so they can focus on the things that are arguably more likely to harm
patients and the public – for example, gross incompetence, sexual assault of
patients, and repeated violations of the standard of the care. Given that
financial problems are among the most significant systemic issues faced by
modern medical boards, boards should take every effort to re-examine their
disciplinary priorities and determine whether there might be a better
allocation of resources that would result in more effective disciplinary
enforcement. This would, in turn, help boards respond to both the
qualitative and quantitative criticisms of the approach they take towards
physician discipline.
V. ALTERNATIVES TO THE CORE VALUES THEORY
The core values theory of discipline, while somewhat ambiguous in
its application, is nevertheless stronger than alternative theories purporting
to justify the exercise of medical board disciplinary authority in cases of
character-related misconduct. This Section adresses three such theories,
which, though intuitively appealing, justify a wider range of disciplinary
action than is permitted under American law. Whether grounded in
prediction, trust, or social contract, each alternative theory arguably satisfies
the state’s police power goals, but fails to take into account the fundamental
legal principles underlying professional discipline, particularly the
constitutional limitation that professional board action bear a rational
relationship to fitness to practice.
A. Prediction Theory
One of the arguments that courts have used to justify discipline for
119

See P. Jung, P. Lurie & S. M. Wolfe, US Physicians Disciplined for Criminal
Activity, 16 Health Matrix: Journal of Law-Medicine 335 (2006).
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character-related misconduct outside the professional sphere is that it may
be predictive of misconduct or error in clinical practice. The Washington
Supreme Court in Haley, for example, held that a physician’s conviction for
tax fraud indicates a “lack of trustworthiness,” raising a “reasonable
apprehension” that he might likewise “abuse the trust inherent in
professional status.”120 Writing of the disciplined physician, the court
explained its difficulty in “compartmentaliz[ing] dishonesty in such a way
that a person who is willing to cheat his government out of $65,000 in taxes
may yet be considered honest in his dealings with his patients.”121 In other
words, if maintaining honesty in patient relations is an element of safe and
effective medical practice, disciplinary action may be appropriate against a
physician who engages in dishonest behavior in the personal realm on the
grounds that he is likewise predisposed to dishonesty in the context of
medical practice.
While this argument has intuitive appeal, its empirical validity is
highly controversial. Scholars of psychology have long debated whether
human behavior is primarily dispositional (that is, grounded in consistent
character traits)122 or situational (that is, dependent on context and
environment).123 Most contemporary theorists conclude that behavior is
generally driven by both dispositional and situational factors,124 though the
balance between the two may vary depending on context. For example,
dispositional or trait-based factors often have less predictive value in
“strong situations” like workplaces, where personal behavior is narrowly
prescribed and often dictated by norms, scripts, and routines.125 On the
120

Haley v. Medical Disciplinary Bd., 818 P.2d 1062, 1069 (Wash. 1991)
Id.; see also Krain v. Medical Board 71 Cal.App.4th 1416 (1999) (holding that “the
intentional solicitation to commit a crime which has as its hallmark an act of dishonesty
cannot be divorced from the obligation of utmost honesty and integrity to the patients
whom the physician counsels.”)
122
See, e.g., Robert McCrae and Paul Costa, Jr., The Five-Factor Theory of
Personality, in HANDBOOK OF PERSONALITY: THEORY AND RESEARCH (Lawrence Pervin
and Oliver John, eds., 2nd Edition, 1995).
123
Situational behaviorists believe that, at heart, context matters: a tendency towards
deceit in one’s personal life does not necessarily predispose a person to fraud in his
professional life. See, e.g., Walter Mischel, PERSONALITY AND ASSESSMENT, 146
(Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1996) (“[T]he concept of personality traits as broad
response predispositions is … untenable.”); Hartshorne and May, STUDIES IN THE NATURE
OF CHARACTER, VOL. 1: STUDIES IN DECEIT (1928) (studying the consistency of behavior
among schoolchildren).
124
[Cite Newton and Keenan (1988), David-Blake and Pfeffer (1989), and others.]
See also Rhode at 556-559 (citing research by Hartshorn and May).
125
[Cite research by Walter Mischel, The Interaction of Person and Situation, in D.
Magnusson & N.S. Endler (eds) Personality at the Crossroads: Current Issues in
International Psychology, pp. 333-352 (1977), A. Davis-Blake and J. Pfeffer, Just a
Mirage: The Search for Dispositional Effects in Organizational Researcg. Academy of
121
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other hand, at least some analyses suggest that conscientiousness (the
character trait that is arguably most relevant to discussions of
professionalism, honesty, and trustworthiness) is fairly consistent across
various situations, including in employment contexts.126
Suffice it to say that social science research on the consistency of
moral behavior as a whole has reached no clear conclusion as to whether
character traits are generally consistent across various domains. Moreover,
little empirical research has been done on the predictors of professional
misconduct and discipline either in the legal or medical realms.127 Of
course, lack of empirical support in an area where little empirical research
has been done is not a reason reject the predictive argument altogether. If a
strong theoretical argument can be made in support of a connection between
discrete elements of personal character and clinical harm to patients, then
perhaps this hypothesis can be used to direct future empirical research about
the predictive value of character-related misconduct.128 The core values
Management Review, 14, 385-400 (1989), and others.] barrack and mount, 1993,
Autonomy as a moderator of the relations between the big five personality dimensions and
job performance. J. Applied Psychology. 78. 111-118]
126
Murray R. Barrick & Michael K. Mount, The Big Five Personality Dimensions and
Job Performance: A Meta-Analysis. 44 Personnel Psychology 1, at 17-18 (1991).
According to this study, elements of conscientiousness include dependability, persistence,
goal-directedness, and organization. Id. at 4.
127
See Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Character as a Professional Credential, 94 Yale
Law Journal, 491, 556 (1985) (summarizing research on predictors of attorney discipline).
In the context of medical practice, most studies examining the predictors of clinical
misconduct or disciplinary complaints look only at correlations with length of practice,
gender, race, and other similar demographic characteristics. See, e.g., James Morrison &
Peter Wickersham, Physicians Disciplined by a State Medical Board, 279 JAMA 1889
(June 17, 1998); Roberto Cardarelli, John C Licciardone & Gilbert Ramirez, Predicting
Risk for Disciplinary Action by a State Medical Board, 100 Texas Medicine 84 (January
2004). Others look at medical school grades and examination scores, but not aspects of
character or personality. See, e.g., H. Hamdy et al., BEME Systematic Review: Predictive
Values of Measurements Obtained in Medical Schools and Future Performance in Medical
Practice, 28 Medical Teacher 103 (2006); Robyn Tamblyn et al., Physician Scores on a
National Clinical Skills Examination as Predictors of Complaints to Medical Regulatory
Authorities, 298 JAMA 993-1001 (September 5, 2007).
The only marginally useful studies of predictors of medical misconduct reveal high
rates of disciplinary recidivism, Darren Grant & Kelly C. Alfred, Sanctions and
Recidivism: An Evaluation of Physician Discipline by State Medical Boards, 32 Journal of
Health Politics Policy and Law 867 (October 1, 2007), or a connection between
“unprofessional conduct” in medical school and board discipline. See Maxine A.
Papadakis et al., Disciplinary Action by Medical Boards and Prior Behavior in Medical
School, 353 N Engl J Med 2673 (December 22, 2005).
128
Moreover, even if empirical research did demonstrate a link between personal
character and safe medical practice, it is by no means clear that the existing system of
medical licensure and discipline would be the most accurate or effective mechanism for
evaluating personal character. See Rhode at 556.
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theory, particularly its emphasis on respect for fiduciary principles, aims to
serve this purpose.
These empirical questions, however, are not nearly as troubling as
the fact that the prediction theory might justify disciplining physicians with
any characteristics that correlate with medical misconduct or poor clinical
judgment in the patient care setting, regardless of their relevance to fitness
to practice. For example, imagine that a retrospective study of physician
characteristics reveals that male OB/GYNs practicing in rural areas are
statistically more likely to be found liable in patient malpractice suits.
Would this justify preemptive discipline?129 Or, to choose an even more
problematic example, imagine that physicians who engage in extramarital
affairs are found fifty times more likely to face patient malpractice suits. A
prediction theorist could argue that those physicians’ lack of honesty in
their personal relationships is predictive of dishonesty in their professional
relationships. But can it really be said that a physician who engages in
extramarital affairs, or a male OB/GYN practicing in a rural area, is unfit to
practice medicine, lacking the intrinsic characteristics of education, training,
and character that form the foundation of competent medical practice? It
seems unlikely. If we are serious about the substantive due process
limitation that demands that licensure and discipline requirements be
rationally related to fitness to practice, the prediction theory is a poor
substitute.
B. Trust Theory
Similar problems arise when trust theories are used to justify
disciplinary inquiries into character-related misconduct. Trust theorists
posit that misconduct outside the clinical sphere is a legitimate subject for
professional discipline if it is likely to cause public distrust of medical
profession. In Kindschi, for example, the Washington Supreme Court
identified the dual goals of professional discipline as protecting the public
and protecting the “standing of the medical profession in the eyes of the
public.”130 More recently, the court held that “conduct may indicate
unfitness to practice medicine if it … lowers the standing of the medical
profession in the public's eyes.”131
Taking these statements at face value, it is difficult to understand
129

[Consider including a brief discussion of criminal law’s approach to prediction and
preventive detention.]
130
In re Kindschi, 319 P.2d 824, 826 (Wash. 1958).
131
Haley v. Medical Disciplinary Bd., 818 P.2d 1062, 1069 (Wash. 1991); See also In
re Lesansky, 17 P.3d 764, 767 (Cal. 2001) (“Attorney discipline is imposed when
necessary ‘to protect the public, to promote confidence in the legal system, and to maintain
high professional standards’”)
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how inquiries into personal misconduct that lowers public opinion of the
profession (but does not otherwise harm patients) relates to the state’s
interests in protecting public health and welfare. Indeed, few courts have
ever expressly identified why the state’s police powers justify disciplinary
action that serves only to protect the medical profession’s position in
society. Perhaps the strongest defense was provided by the Washington
Supreme Court in Haley, where it affirmed that preserving medical
professionalism “is not an end in itself,” but merely an “an instrumental end
pursued in order to serve the State's legitimate interest in promoting and
protecting the public welfare.”132 Wrote the court, “To perform their
professional duties effectively, physicians must enjoy the trust and
confidence of their patients. Conduct that lowers the public's esteem for
physicians erodes that trust and confidence, and so undermines a necessary
condition for the profession's execution of its vital role in preserving public
health through medical treatment and advice.”133 This link between public
trust and professional efficacy has been widely recognized by legal
scholars, most notably by Mark Hall, who posits that trust is a fundamental
element of the healing relationship,134 without which vulnerable patients
would not be willing to seek care.135 Without systemic medical trust, Hall
argues, the medical profession would not be able to effectively achieve the
state’s goals in patient welfare and public health.136 Under this view, then,
any behavior that diminishes patients’ confidence in the medical profession
could be an appropriate subject for professional discipline.
This approach towards character-related physician misconduct is
problematic for the same reasons as the predictive theory. Even accepting a
connection between private misconduct and public trust in medicine, this
kind of correlation alone may not be a strong enough justification for state
intervention. Patients may place faith in their physicians for any number of
reasons – their religion, their affiliation with a particular hospital, their
personal appearance – and it is by no means clear why a state should
132

Haley, 818 P.2d at 1070.
Id.
134
Mark A. Hall, Law, Medicine, and Trust, 55 STAN. L. REV. 463, 480 (2002).
135
Hall, supra note 134, at 478; Mark A. Hall et al., Trust in Physicians and Medical
Institutions: What Is It, Can It Be Measured, and Does It Matter?, 79 MILBANK Q. 613,
614 (2002).
136
See also Starr, supra note X, at 5 (addressing the importance of clinical authority to
the therapeutic process); David Mechanic, The Functions and Limitations of Trust in the
Provision of Medical Care, 23 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 661 (1998) (describing the
effects of erosion of trust on the effectiveness of medical interventions). However,
empirical evidence of whether a single physician’s misconduct actually affects public trust
in the profession as a whole (and whether disciplinary action taken by a state medical board
actually serves to counteract this effect) is scarce and by no means conclusive. See Hall, at
496-98.
133
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facilitate patient decisions that are based on non-clinical, irrelevant, or
potentially discriminatory factors that have no clear link with fitness or
competency to practice medicine.137 In defining a physician’s character by
reference to public perception, courts have effectively defined it outside of
the scope of fitness to practice, which under even a relatively
uncontroversial definition speaks to the physician’s intrinsic capabilities in
the realm of education, training, and character. In contrast, when courts
write about protecting the profession’s standing, they are describing a
change in public perception, rather than a change in qualities intrinsic to the
medical professional. Defining the character element of fitness to practice
by reference to public perception will not limit the scope of permissible
professional discipline; rather, it has the potential to encompass even some
categories of conduct that bear only the weakest connection to the state’s
interest in protecting the public’s health and medical welfare. For example,
though a physician’s possession of two unregistered submachine guns may
tend to “undermine public confidence in the integrity of the profession,” 138
it is difficult to see how this fact alone would call into question the
physician’s ability to practice medicine safely and with the best interests of
patients at heart.
Accordingly, although the argument from public trust may offer one
explanation of how professional discipline serves the state’s police power
goals, it alone is not an adequate justification for discipline that does not
otherwise satisfy constitutional scrutiny.139
C. Social Contract Theory
A final argument that can be made to justify professional discipline
for character-related misconduct is grounded in social contract theory.
While it may bear some similarities to the trust arguments described above,
137

See generally, R. Gatter, Faith, Confidence and Health Care: Fostering Trust in
Medicine through Law, 39 Wake Forest Law Review 395 (2004) (distinguishing between
trust as faith and trust as confidence in competence); see also Mark A. Hall, Caring,
Curing and Trust: A Response to Gatter, 39 Wake Forest Law Review, 2004.
138
See Raymond v. Board of Registration in Medicine, 443 N.E.2d 391, 394 (Mass.
1982).
139
Another common criticism is that that defining fitness to practice by reference to
public trust is evidence of the profession’s “shallow vanity,” rather than any concern for
public welfare. See generally, Keith Swisher, The Troubling Rise of the Legal Profession’s
Good Moral Character, 82 St. John's L. Rev. 1037, 1062 (2008) (“The bar is not concerned
with reputable character in any meaningful sense. As we have seen, it routinely denies
applicants of present reputable character. Such denials would be wholly arbitrary under a
reputable character standard. Instead, the bar is more concerned with "reputable relational
character" - that is, whether an applicant's past conduct is consistent with the bar's
perceived self-image. This outlandish definition reconciles the cases - "fitness" to practice
law is fitness to cohere with the bar's exalted self-image.”).
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it is worth discussing in its own right.
In the context of medicine, social contract theory posits that medical
professionals are entitled to the privileges of exclusive licensure and selfregulation only by virtue of an (implicit or explicit) agreement to take
responsibility for the provision of important social goods140 and to hold
themselves to higher standards of conduct than the general population.141
Accordingly, if a physician breaches this social contract, the state would be
justified in restricting his right to practice.
The primary problem with this approach is that it not clear either
that such a social contract exists, or that it binds physicians to particular
standards of personal character or behavior. After all, if reasonable
decisionmakers can disagree as to whether tax fraud constitutes
“unprofessional conduct” subject to professional discipline, it is difficult to
conclude that there is a social contract between physicians and society
prohibiting this behavior. Moreover, if we think of the many kinds of
obligations that could be imposed on physicians as a condition of licensure
but that American law fails to recognize in that context – for example, the
obligation to provide uncompensated care to indigent patients,142 or the
obligation to treat patients during a public health emergency even at their
own risk143 – social contract theory seems even less relevant in justifying
obligations with a more tenuous link to public health and patient safety.
Indeed, social contract theory is typically used to defend professional
ethical obligations, rather than legal obligations.
Moreover, even assuming that physicians enter into a clear social
contract prohibiting character-related misconduct when they receive their
medical licenses, social contract theory faces the same problems as
prediction theory and trust theories: while requiring that licensed
professionals satisfy higher standards of character may serve the state’s
goals in protecting public welfare, it runs afoul of the fitness to practice
140

See generally, Wilbert E. Moore, THE PROFESSIONS: ROLES AND RULES, 6 (1970);
Michael D. Bayles, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, 8-9 (1988); William M. Sullivan, WORK AND
INTEGRITY: THE CRISIS AND PROMISE OF PROFESSIONALISM IN AMERICA, 4-5, 9-10 (2004);
Corinne Lathrop Gilb, HIDDEN HIERARCHIES: THE PROFESSIONS AND GOVERNMENT, 53-54
(1966).
141
See Sullivan, supra note 140, at 2; William M. Sullivan, What Is Left of
Professionalism after Managed Care?, 29 HASTINGS CENTER REPORT 7, at 10-11 (Apr. 13,
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limitation on professional licensure and discipline. Given that our society
imposes constitutional limitations on the exercise of state authority, a social
contract to which the state is a party cannot violate these constitutional
limitations.
CONCLUSION
If there is to be any uniformity and consistency in medical
discipline, state medical boards must exercise their disciplinary discretion
pursuant to some guiding theory of professional discipline. Moreover, this
theory must be consistent with the guiding principles of professional
discipline under American law – the primary concern of public protection,
tempered by constitutional fitness to practice requirements that limit the
scope of permissible disciplinary action. This Article proposes a theory that
identifies the core values essential for safe and effective medical practice,
and authorizes discipline where a physician’s behavior demonstrates a
failure to recognize those core values. Of the key values that have been
considered by medical boards and courts as relevant to professional fitness,
the principle of fiduciary duty is the one most likely to garner consensus
among lawmakers, patients, and medical professionals. While it clearly
limits the scope of professional discipline to misconduct deriving from a
physician’s privileged position or clinical skills, it offers lawmakers,
medical boards, and courts significant flexibility in determining what
constitutes harm to a beneficiary.
Compared to alternative theories of discipline, which threaten to
encompass a wide variety of personal behavior that does not clearly
implicate fitness to practice, the core values theory of discipline
incorporates these constitutional limitations within its structure. Moreover,
it offers significant benefits in terms of consistency, identifying some
categories of conduct as relevant to professional discipline, and
categorically excluding others. Finally, and most importantly, the core
values theory offers a means by which boards can reevaluate their
disciplinary priorities and increase their effectiveness in a budget-neutral
manner.
While efforts to more clearly delineate the scope of justifiable
professional discipline may be misconstrued as inappropriately limiting
medical boards’ ability to protect the public, these concerns are unfounded.
The issue at hand is not whether boards are disciplining physicians often
enough, but rather whether boards are exercising their disciplinary powers
in the most effective and efficient manner. Despite some recent expansions
of authority, medical boards generally operate under significant financial
and constraints, and necessarily maintain a system of triage in matters of
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discipline. The active pursuit of baseless or irrelevant complaints detracts
from the boards’ ability to focus on professional misconduct that may have
a far more direct impact on patient safety and the protection of public
health. Accordingly, both the effectiveness and the continued relevance of
the current system of professional board discipline depend on a clear
understanding of how it can justifiably be exercised.
***
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